EastBridge Insight Week #01 | EastBridge Think Lab

Monday, August 3

Washington. The Department of Defense announces framework agreements with Northrop Grumman and Lockheed Martin providing for a threefold increase in the production of Patriot interceptor missiles and a fourfold increase in the production of THAAD system components. Under Secretary of War for Acquisition and Sustainment Michael Duffey justifies the decision by citing the need for “robust and flexible supply chains at every level of the industrial base.” The department points to a long-term goal of increasing production to nearly 14,000 missiles and interceptors of both types.

Iran, Oman. Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmail Baghai says that talks with Muscat now concern a single temporary corridor through the Strait of Hormuz rather than the two routes considered previously. According to the Iranian representative, the aim is to establish an arrangement lasting one to three months, while preserving Iran’s dominant role in security, mine clearance and maritime operations.

Eastern Front. At least 27 people are killed within 24 hours, 16 on the Russian side and 11 on the Ukrainian side. The heaviest losses result from falling drone debris in the resort town of Arkhipo-Osipovka in Krasnodar Krai, where seven people are killed, including three children.

Riyadh, Washington. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman holds a telephone conversation with Donald Trump focused on regional de-escalation.

Tuesday, August 4

Washington. The scale of interceptor missile expenditure is revealed. CNN, citing sources, describes U.S. stockpiles as “dangerously low” and reports that this was one of the reasons for cancelling some planned strikes on Iran.

Iran. According to estimates by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the number of Patriot missiles in the two most advanced variants fell from approximately 2,330 before the war with Iran to 1,030 by the time of the April ceasefire, and after fighting resumed to between 759 and 827—a decline of approximately 65–67 percent from pre-war levels. THAAD stocks fell from 452 to 232–262 in April and, following partial replenishment, stood at 234–278, representing a decline of at least 38 percent. More than 1,000 Tomahawk missiles have been fired, while ATACMS and PrSM inventories have been largely depleted. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth almost immediately disputes the cited percentages on X, without providing figures of his own.

Commentary by Oliwier Gorgoń: The collapse of interceptor missile stockpiles and the erosion of missile defense in the Middle East. The numbers, rather than the rhetoric, are what matter, and they point to three conclusions. The first concerns the pace of replenishment. At the production and delivery rates cited by analysts, the Pentagon may be receiving around 20 Patriot missiles and 15 Tomahawks per month. CSIS estimates that restoring THAAD inventories to pre-war levels will take at least three years, while some scenarios envisage replenishment taking even longer, potentially until the end of the decade. The agreements with Northrop Grumman and Lockheed Martin announced the previous day are a response that is years overdue, because the bottleneck is not the assembly lines themselves but component suppliers, including manufacturers of rocket motors and electronics. Tripling production is a declaration with a multi-year horizon, not a solution to the current crisis.

With inventories at these levels, commanders may be forced to use interceptors more selectively and reduce the number of missiles allocated to individual targets, directly increasing the probability that an incoming threat will penetrate the defense system. This is the essence of the phenomenon: missile defense in the Middle East has not been defeated technologically, but has been exhausted economically and logistically. Iran and the Houthis are waging a cost-exchange war in which an interceptor worth several million dollars is expended against targets worth tens of thousands. No system based on expensive kinetic interceptors can sustain such arithmetic in a protracted conflict—and this is precisely the character that the war with Iran has assumed since February 2026.

The consequences extend beyond the region. CSIS states explicitly that the depletion of reserves has opened a “window of vulnerability” to conflict in the Western Pacific. For the Gulf states, this means that the U.S. missile-defense umbrella is no longer an unlimited resource, which provides the immediate background to the Mecca Pact signed three days later. For Ukraine, it means competition for the same shrinking pool of resources. For Poland, it means that PAC-3 MSE missiles—currently a key element of Poland’s missile-defense layer capable of countering certain ballistic threats, including Iskander-class missiles—have become a globally scarce commodity, and any decision to transfer them is now strategic in nature rather than merely a gesture of solidarity. It is also worth noting the growing divergence between political messaging and departmental action: during the same week, the White House denied that a problem existed while the Pentagon urgently pressed industry to accelerate deliveries.

Tokyo. Publication of the defense white paper. The Japanese government releases its annual Defense of Japan 2026 document. In the foreword, Defense Minister Shinjiro Koizumi writes that, drawing lessons from Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, countries around the world are preparing for new forms of warfare, including the mass use of unmanned systems, as well as for protracted conflicts. China remains an “unprecedented and greatest strategic challenge,” to which Tokyo intends to respond with its “comprehensive national power.” The document highlights the expansion of Chinese activity beyond the First Island Chain toward the Second Island Chain, including aircraft-carrier operations around Iwo Jima, as well as gray-zone activities around Taiwan.

North Korea is described as a threat “more serious and imminent than ever before,” with particular attention paid to advances in hypersonic technologies, irregular trajectories, and saturation-attack capabilities, as well as the possibility that deepening military cooperation with Russia could strengthen Pyongyang’s capabilities over the medium and long term. Russia is discussed in the context of deployments of its latest equipment in the Far East and joint bomber flights and naval operations with China around Japan, assessed as “clearly intended demonstrations.” For the first time, the white paper contains an extensive dedicated chapter on innovation, emphasizing dual-use technologies, artificial intelligence and the development of resilient ammunition supply chains. The document sets a goal of raising defense spending to 2 percent of GDP, compared with the current level of approximately 1.9 percent.

Commentary by Oliwier Gorgoń: “Defense of Japan 2026” as a project for state modernization. This year’s white paper is interesting not because of its hierarchy of threats, which has remained unchanged since 2022, but because of the logic of the response it adopts. Its diagnosis mirrors the U.S. missile crisis. Tokyo identifies the threat explicitly: saturation attacks, irregular trajectories, hypersonic systems, mass use of unmanned platforms and protracted conflict. It is exactly the same problem reflected in the U.S. figures on Patriot and THAAD stocks published during the same week, except viewed from the demand side rather than the supply side. The difference lies in the response. Japan is not announcing another major purchase of interceptors, but shifting the emphasis toward rebuilding its industrial base, ammunition supply chains and dual-use capabilities.

The document explicitly links defense procurement with economic and regional policy: higher margins for contractors, simplified procedures, and greater openness to start-ups and smaller companies, following decades in which corporations such as Komatsu and Sumitomo reduced their defense divisions because of low margins and weak demand. Tokyo is also defining itself as a hub for industrial cooperation rather than merely a recipient of security, as illustrated by the frigate program pursued with Australia. In April 2026, the government also eased export restrictions, allowing the export of “equipment with strike capabilities.”

This approach is almost entirely absent from the Polish debate on air defense, even though the underlying problem is identical: without domestic production capacity and predictable demand, declarations about multilayered defense cannot be sustained during a crisis. Publication on August 4, two days before the anniversary of Hiroshima and five days before the anniversary of Nagasaki, sharpened the contrast that dominated the Japanese debate that week. Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi repeatedly referred to a “realistic and pragmatic approach,” and on August 7 declined to say whether Japan’s three non-nuclear principles would be included in the strategic documents due to be revised by the end of 2026. If the principle prohibiting the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japanese territory were removed, it would constitute the most significant adjustment to Japanese nuclear policy since Eisaku Sato’s declaration of 1967.

Another element relevant to our region is worth noting: Japan once again formally points to the risk of technology transfers from Russia to North Korea, while during the same week Ukrainian intelligence revealed the deployment of a North Korean missile unit in Voronezh Oblast. The two developments are part of the same process. Finally, the document’s presentation—an anime-style cover, short video materials, and language aimed at younger generations—should be understood as an element of building societal resilience rather than as a curiosity. Beijing described the Takaichi government’s actions as “reckless new militarism.”

Hormuz. Secretary of State Marco Rubio speaks of “progress, but not finalization.” According to Axios, the parties were aiming to announce an interim agreement on Wednesday. In addition to Oman, representatives of Qatar, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia were involved in mediation, while direct talks were conducted by Steve Witkoff, Abbas Araghchi and Badr al-Busaidi. UKMTO reports that a merchant vessel was struck by an unidentified projectile off the coast of Oman.

Russia, North Korea. HUR representative Andriy Cherniak tells Reuters that, according to Ukrainian intelligence, Russia is deploying a North Korean missile unit of approximately 90 personnel in Voronezh Oblast, around 150 km from the Ukrainian border. The unit is expected to become part of Russia’s 112th Missile Brigade and ultimately operate six launchers with as many as 120 missiles. Pyongyang has already supplied a batch of 40 KN-23 and KN-24 missiles together with their crews. The final configuration is expected to be determined during high-level talks in September.

Wednesday, August 5

Washington. Deputy Secretary of Defense Steve Feinberg sends a letter to defense companies, subsequently revealed by The Washington Post, giving them no more than 21 days to submit proposals for shortening delivery times and expanding production capacity.

Kyiv. Volodymyr Zelensky acknowledges that in 2026 Ukraine’s allies have supplied the country with approximately one-third as many interceptor missiles as during the corresponding period of the previous year.

Black Sea. Russian drones repeatedly strike the bulk carrier EMIL (Liberian flag, owned by Hamburg-based Johann M. K. Blumenthal) approximately 21 nautical miles from Odesa; another strike occurs while its eleven-member crew is being evacuated. The general cargo vessel Mera Queen, carrying grain under the flag of Guinea-Bissau, is also damaged, with one sailor killed. In the same series of strikes, a Puma logistics center and a Liqui Moly warehouse in the Kyiv area are destroyed.

Washington. NBC News reports, citing sources, that draft guidelines for U.S. nuclear strategy may shift the emphasis from long-range strategic arsenals toward short-range tactical nuclear weapons intended for use in a regional conflict with China or Russia.

Kazakhstan / Georgia. Kazakhstan continues exporting oil through the Georgian port of Batumi following drone attacks on the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) marine terminal in Novorossiysk. Tengizchevroil (TCO) plans to ship 100,000 tonnes of oil through Batumi in August; approximately 20,000 tonnes were transported through the port in July. The oil is carried by rail to Batumi and then loaded onto tankers bound for Turkey.

Thursday, August 6

Hiroshima. The 81st anniversary. Approximately 50,000 people and representatives of nearly 120 countries, including the United States and Iran, attend the ceremony at Peace Memorial Park. In his Peace Declaration, Mayor Kazumi Matsui criticizes major powers for treating nuclear deterrence as a realistic approach. Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, attending the commemoration for the first time in that role, pledges a “realistic approach” within the framework of the NPT.

Hormuz. Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi says that Tehran and Muscat have agreed on the coordinates of a corridor, with most of the route expected to run through Iranian territorial waters. Reports emerge of a draft Iranian law prohibiting the transit of “hostile” vessels, after which oil prices rise by approximately 4 percent.

Azerbaijan / Kazakhstan. Installation of a 380-kilometer submarine fiber-optic cable between Sumgait in Azerbaijan and Aktau in Kazakhstan across the Caspian seabed is completed. The project was carried out by AzerTelecom and Kazakhtelecom and forms part of Azerbaijan’s Digital Silk Way initiative. The cable is ultimately expected to provide capacity of more than 400 Tbps and form part of a digital corridor connecting Europe and Asia through Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey and Kazakhstan.

Friday, August 7

Mecca. Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan sign a trilateral defense agreement. The document is signed by Mohammed bin Salman, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and Shehbaz Sharif. A joint statement says the agreement is intended to strengthen collective deterrence against any act of aggression and that an armed attack against any of the three states will be treated as an attack against all of them. The agreement remains open to other states in the region. The Turkish side emphasizes its defensive nature and the absence of any specific target, while Saudi Deputy Minister for Public Diplomacy Rayed Krimly says that the pact poses no threat to any state. Negotiations lasted nearly a year. On the same day, the Houthis attack Saudi forces at a base in eastern Yemen. Neither Benjamin Netanyahu’s office nor the Israeli Foreign Ministry comments on the agreement.

Commentary by Oliwier Gorgoń: The Mecca Pact and the new Middle Eastern security architecture can be regarded as one of the most significant changes in the region’s security architecture in recent years. The agreement should be viewed on three levels.

Pakistan is the only Muslim-majority state possessing nuclear weapons. Islamabad has consistently maintained that the 2025 agreement did not include a nuclear umbrella, and formally nothing has changed in this regard. In practice, however, each successive document deepens the ambiguity—and ambiguity is a currency of deterrence. One can argue that the agreement itself does not automatically constitute a violation of the NPT because it provides for neither the transfer nor the deployment of nuclear weapons. From a non-proliferation perspective, however, this is more difficult to address than a single violation because it is immeasurable and unenforceable, while also being easy to replicate by other states in the region, to which the document formally remains open.

Riyadh has had defense commitments toward the Gulf Cooperation Council states since 2000 and toward Pakistan since 2025. None has ever triggered a response comparable to Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. Pakistan has already deployed some forces and air-defense assets to Saudi Arabia, but it remains unclear whether, and in what form, Islamabad or Ankara would participate in a Saudi response to Houthi strikes. The test came immediately, on August 7 and 9, and in both cases the response remained exclusively Saudi. The most tangible benefit therefore remains diplomatic leverage: at the beginning of the war with Iran, Riyadh used its relationship with Islamabad to quietly shape negotiations and manage escalation.

Turkey, a NATO member, is assuming a collective-defense commitment outside Alliance structures and toward non-NATO partners. This raises the question of possible involvement in a regional conflict that the rest of NATO might prefer to avoid, as well as the hierarchy of obligations should they come into conflict. Ankara is thereby building its position as an autonomous center of power while retaining its membership and the benefits that come with it. The same mechanism was visible during the same week in the issue of control over the straits, which Turkey leveraged in its relations with Russia and Ukraine.

The Mecca Pact is a political response to the problem revealed three days earlier in Washington. If U.S. interceptor inventories have proven exhaustible while Aramco refineries are being struck regularly, the Gulf states will seek additional guarantees wherever they can obtain them quickly and without Washington’s approval. This does not amount to a break with the United States, but rather to risk diversification, analogous to European discussions about the French nuclear umbrella. For a non-proliferation analyst, the important point is that both processes—the European and Middle Eastern ones—indicate that the erosion of confidence in U.S. guarantees is becoming the principal driver behind the proliferation of new, informal deterrence arrangements.

Washington. The U.S. Senate passes a sanctions bill. The _Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026_passes by 86 votes to 11. The legislation provides for primary and secondary sanctions against Russia, measures targeting the so-called shadow fleet, restrictions against Russian officials, oligarchs, and members of their families, and authorization for the president to impose tariffs of up to 100 percent on the five largest importers of Russian hydrocarbons. A separate section extends the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996. The bill proceeds to the House of Representatives, which will not return from recess until September.

Omaha. During the Deterrence Symposium, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby confirms that a review is underway of guidelines governing the use of nuclear weapons, including the authority of the STRATCOM commander and the powers of the Secretary of Defense. He says the document will not be made public.

Camp Kościuszko. The U.S. Army confirms that Lieutenant General Charles Costanza has been relieved of command of V Corps, nearly two months before the scheduled end of his tenure. Brigadier General John B. Mountford assumes the duties on an interim basis, while the Senate-confirmed successor, Major General Thomas Feltey, is expected to take command in October. No reason is disclosed. V Corps, whose forward command post is located in Poznań, is responsible for coordinating U.S. Army operations in Europe and for a significant portion of support for Ukraine conducted from Polish territory.

Paris. The VIGINUM agency and French media describe disinformation campaigns targeting former prime minister Gabriel Attal—through fabricated materials suggesting that he suffers from a serious neurological illness and accounts impersonating BFM TV—and Raphaël Glucksmann, through a cloned version of the investigative outlet Blast and forged documents. Responsibility is attributed to the Matryoshka and Storm-1516 networks.

Minsk. The Foreign Policy Research Institute publishes an analysis of Belarusian Su-25 exercises conducted in May. Photographs show no components corresponding to known Russian tactical nuclear warheads or their training mock-ups. The aircraft were equipped with Belarusian Talisman electronic-warfare pods, while the exercises were conducted at a reserve airfield in Babruysk using dummy weapons. The Su-25 component is assessed as “nuclear in name only.”

Assessment of the situation on the front. ISW notes that on August 6, Vladimir Putin held a telephone conversation with the commander of the 76th Guards Air Assault Division, indicating the prioritization of the Pokrovsk and Dobropillia directions and an intention to conduct a broad envelopment of Ukraine’s fortress belt from the southwest. The timelines assumed by the Russian side are assessed as unrealistic.

Kazakhstan / Uzbekistan. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan agree on joint measures to enter new export markets in Syria and Iraq. The arrangements include joint business missions: a delegation of 20–30 companies is expected to travel to Aleppo in late September, followed by another mission to Erbil in Iraqi Kurdistan in early October. A trilateral business forum involving Uzbek, Kazakh, and Syrian companies is also planned in Aleppo.

Saturday, August 8

Ankara. Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan says Turkey has presented Kyiv and Moscow with a proposal to develop a mechanism for a moratorium on attacks against merchant vessels in the Black Sea; the initiative reportedly originated with Ukraine. At the same time, Ankara introduces additional security measures for vessels transiting the straits while declaring that navigation will continue in accordance with the Montreux Convention. The immediate reason for the measures was injuries sustained by Turkish sailors in drone attacks.

Sunday, August 9

Jerusalem. Benjamin Netanyahu tells a cabinet meeting that Israel rejects the fifteen-point document prepared by the Board of Peace and accepted by Hamas in late July. He says Israeli forces will not withdraw until Hamas has been effectively disarmed, including both heavy and light weapons. Israeli elections are scheduled for late October.

Jizan, Al-Mukha. The Houthis claim responsibility for a drone attack on the Aramco refinery in Jizan, which has a processing capacity of 400,000 barrels per day, saying the strike was retaliation for violations of Yemeni airspace over the provinces of Hajjah and Saada. Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Energy confirms that a fire occurred and was extinguished without casualties, but does not publicly confirm either responsibility for the attack or that the facility itself was struck. A strike on the port of Al-Mukha on the Red Sea coast kills between seven and eleven people. The de-escalation process in place since 2022 has significantly weakened, while the Houthis announce a naval blockade of Saudi Arabia operating in parallel with Iran’s blockade of the Strait of Hormuz.

Hormuz. Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi says Iran is “very close” to an agreement with Oman, but that reopening the strait remains conditional on additional demands: the lifting of the U.S. naval blockade of Iranian ports, compensation for the violation of the June memorandum, the removal of sanctions, and the unconditional release of frozen assets. Oman describes the talks as “positive and constructive.”

Sources:

https://caspianpolicy.org/research/category/europe-caspian-briefing-aug-11-2026

https://ru.themoscowtimes.com/2026/08/05/kazahstan-dogovorilsya-ob-eksporte-nefti-v-obhod-rf-posle-ostanovki-terminala-v-novorossiiske-a202706

https://azertag.az/en/xeber/installation_of_trans_caspian_fiber_optic_cable_on_seabed_of_caspian_sea_completed-4355289

https://astanatimes.com/2026/08/kazakhstan-uzbekistan-join-forces-to-pursue-new-export-markets-in-syria-and-iraq

https://www.defensenews.com/news/pentagon-congress/2026/08/03/pentagon-moves-to-triple-patriot-quadruple-thaad-interceptor-production/

https://www.stripes.com/theaters/us/2026-08-03/thaad-patriot-missile-production-increase-22445963.html

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https://news.cgtn.com/news/2026-08-04/Japan-s-new-defense-white-paper-paves-way-for-military-buildup-1PkR7dgNzm8/p.html

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